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A Coffee Break for Bitcoin
MARGARET RYZNAR*
For many, the appeal of bitcoin is in its detachment from government regulation.
However, the Coffee bonding theory, which initially arose in the context of foreign
stocks, suggests certain benefits of regulation for bitcoin, including increased
legitimacy. By invoking the Coffee bonding theory, this Article offers another
perspective on the regulation of bitcoin.
INTRODUCTION
As bitcoin has become more mainstream, it has drawn the attention of regulators.
Transactions in bitcoin have received scrutiny from the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), and the federal courts. 1 These agencies have differed in their
treatments of virtual currency, and confusion continues over whether the law
considers bitcoin to be securities, commodities, currency, or property. 2
Thus far, comprehensive regulation has been unsuccessful. Not only have many
bitcoin users resisted regulation, but regulation has also stalled because it is unclear
how to regulate virtual currency. 3 The challenges to regulation include bitcoin’s
rapid growth and the anonymity surrounding bitcoin. 4

* Professor of Law, Indiana University McKinney School of Law.
1. Christopher Burks, Bitcoin: Breaking Bad or Breaking Barriers?, 18 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. ONLINE 244 (2017). Most recently, the IRS issued warning letters to over 10,000
cryptocurrency holders regarding possible back taxes. See, e.g., Laura Saunders & Britton
O’Daly, IRS Sending Warning Letters to More Than 10,000 Cryptocurrency Holders, WALL
STREET J. (July 26, 2019, 6:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/irs-sending-warningletters-to-more-than-10-000-cryptocurrency-holders-11564159523 [https://perma.cc/VS4HMU5V].
2. Burks, supra note 1.
3. “Nakamoto’s writings acknowledge the attractiveness of Bitcoin to libertarians, but
they do not specifically support any view of his own politics.” Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins,
Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 257,
260 n.13 (2014) (citing Posting of Satoshi Nakamoto to cryptography@metzdowd.com (Nov.
14, 2008), http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg10001.html
[https://perma.cc/R73A-SBDH]).
4. See, e.g., Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency
Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271 (2015); Misha Tsukerman, The Block Is
Hot: A Survey of the State of Bitcoin Regulation and Suggestions for the Future, 30 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1127 (2015).
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The Coffee bonding theory, which arose in the context of foreign stocks, suggests
several benefits of regulation for bitcoin, including increased legitimacy. By
invoking the Coffee bonding theory, this Article offers another perspective on the
regulation of bitcoin.
I. FOREIGN STOCKS & BONDING THEORY
Public companies located outside the United States may have lighter regulatory
standards compared to those located in the United States. 5 In contrast, high
regulatory standards and oversight for companies in the United States have made it
a secure place to invest. 6 However, foreign companies may cross-list their shares on
a U.S. exchange if they subject themselves to American regulatory standards, 7
including disclosure and legal requirements. 8
There are many reasons for foreign companies to cross-list their shares in the
United States. 9 Benefits include exposure to an international capital market, which
can create changes in corporate governance and improve investors’ perception of the
quality of governance. 10 A U.S. listing can also reduce the extent to which controlling
shareholders can engage in expropriation and thereby increase the ﬁrm’s ability to
take advantage of growth opportunities. 11 Among the principle considerations that
drive a company’s decision to cross-list its shares are: financial gains, increased

5. The lack of regulation may make high rewards possible. Ashoka Mody, What Is An
Emerging Market?, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 641, 642 (2004).
6. For background on securities law in the United States, see Paul G. Mahoney, The
Development of Securities Law in the United States, 47 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 325 (2009).
7. Kyle W. Pine, Lowering the Cost of Rent: How IFRS and the Convergence of
Corporate Governance Standards Can Help Foreign Issuers Raise Capital in the United
States and Abroad, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 483, 483 n.1 (2010).
8. Stephen P. Ferris, Kenneth A. Kim & Gregory Noronha, The Effect of Crosslisting on
Corporate Governance: A Review of the International Evidence, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN
INT’L REV. 338, 343-45 (2009); see also James A. Fanto & Roberta S. Karmel, A Report on
the Attitudes of Foreign Companies Regarding a U.S. Listing, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 51, 5358 (1997) (providing an overview of U.S. laws and regulations affecting foreign companies
that wish to reach U.S. capital markets investors).
9. For example, one reason to cross-list might be to facilitate acquisitions. See, e.g., Pasi
Tolmunen & Sami Torstila, Cross-Listings and M&A Activity: Transatlantic Evidence, 34 FIN.
MGMT. 123 (2005) (revealing evidence from a sample of 547 European companies that crosslisted firms are significantly more active in acquiring U.S. companies than their domestically
listed peers); see also Fanto & Karmel, supra note 8 (citing disclosure requirements, business
purposes, benefits of U.S. capital markets, and industry specific incentives as considerations
in the decision of whether to cross-list in the United States).
10. Ferris, Kim & Noronha, supra note 8, at 338.
11. Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Why Are Foreign Firms Listed
in the U.S. Worth More?, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (2004).
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liquidity, shares marketability, and growth motivations. 12 Companies must weigh
these benefits against the compliance and other costs of cross-listing. 13
Empirical research confirms the benefits of cross-listing. One team of authors
examined what happens to the global value of trading, turnover, and prices of 128
non-U.S. stocks over the twelve-month period surrounding their listing on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 14 The results suggest that listing on the NYSE
benefits the home market and the U.S. market, as well as the companies being listed:
“stock prices in the six months after listing are 8% higher than prices in the six
months immediately prior.” 15
Another study reveals that foreign firms that cross-list shares on U.S.
exchanges “earn cumulative abnormal returns of 19% during the year before listing,
and an additional 1.20% during the listing week, but incur a loss of 14% during the
year following listing.” 16 Such “unusual share price changes are robust to changing
market risk exposures and are related to an expansion of the shareholder base and to
the amount of capital raised at the time of listing.” 17 Yet another scholar noted that
growth opportunities are more highly valued for companies that cross-list on
American stock exchanges, especially those from countries with weaker investor
rights. 18
Finally, another paper examines whether cross-listing in the United States reduces
foreign ﬁrms’ cost of capital. 19 The authors find strong evidence that it does,

12. Ahmed Ibrahim & Mohamed Youssef, Cross-Listing and Implications on Corporate
Governance, ta’ameen Qatar (Nov. 2013), http://www.taameenqatar.com/index.php?go=s&s
=cross-listing-and-implications-on-corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/9R6L-26GH].
13. Shahrokh M. Saudagaran, An Empirical Study of Selected Factors Influencing the
Decision to List on Foreign Stock Exchanges, 19 J. INT’L BUS. STUDIES 101 (Spring 1988)
(noting that the growing internationalization of capital markets suggests that an increasing
number of firms perceive the benefits of listing their stocks on foreign exchanges as
outweighing the related cost). However, the SEC recently lessened the regulatory burden for
cross-listing companies, such as by changing the registration and reporting forms to the
standardized requirements of the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO). Yuliya Guseva, Cross-Listings and the New World of International Capital:
Another Look at the Efficiency and Extraterritoriality of Securities Law, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L.
411, 451-56 (2013).
14. Katherine Smith & George Sofianos, The Impact of an NYSE Listing on the Global
Trading of Non-U.S. Stocks (NYSE Working Paper 97-02, 1997). On average, the authors find
that “the combined (home plus U.S.) value of trading in the sample stocks changed from $240
million per stock per day prior to the NYSE listing to $340 million after, a 42% increase, and
that the home-market value of trading increased 24% from $210 to $260 million, while annual
turnover increased from 65 to 90%.” Id.
15. Id.
16. Stephen R. Foerster & G. Andrew Karolyi, The Effects of Market Segmentation and
Investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the United
States, 54 J. OF FIN. 981 (1999).
17. Id.
18. Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, supra note 11.
19. Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, Cost of Capital Effects and Changes in Growth
Expectations Around U.S. Cross-Listings (European Corporate Governance Institute Working
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especially for ﬁrms from countries with weaker institutional structures. Furthermore,
the authors explain that cross-listing creates positive valuation effects stemming from
changes in growth expectations. 20
Although cross-listing has traditionally been credited with these various
benefits, 21 the globalization of financial markets and instantaneous electronic
communications may make such explanations dated. 22 Another prominent
explanation put forth in the 1990s by Professor Coffee is “bonding.” According to
this theory, “issuers migrate to U.S. exchanges because by voluntarily subjecting
themselves to the United States’ higher disclosure standards and greater threat of
enforcement (both by public and private enforcers), they partially compensate for
weak protection of minority investors under their own jurisdictions’ laws and thereby
achieve a higher market valuation.” 23 In other words, firms are choosing to “rent”
the securities laws of other countries. 24
In sum, commentators have offered several explanations for the significant crosslisting of foreign company shares on exchanges in the United States, including the
prominent Coffee bonding theory, which argues that there are legitimacy gains to
renting American securities laws through cross-listing. This theory on regulation has
direct implications in the bitcoin context.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR BITCOIN
Satoshi Nakamoto, a pseudonym for an unknown person, designed bitcoin and
introduced it in a 2008 white paper titled “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
System.” 25 Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency, which is a digital currency issued
electronically by a computer program. Bitcoin has a predetermined cap of 21

Paper, 2006).
20. Id.
21. See also H. Kent Baker, John R. Nofisnger & Daniel G. Weaver, International CrossListing and Visibility, 37 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 495 (2002) (offering a study showing
that international firms listing their shares on the New York or London Stock Exchange
experience a significant increase in visibility, as proxied by analyst coverage and print media
attention, and a decrease in the cost of equity capital after the listing event).
22. John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757
(2002).
23. Id. See also René M. Stulz, Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of
Capital, 12 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FINANCE 8 (Fall 1999); William A. Reese Jr. & Michael S.
Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States,
and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 65 (2002) (concluding that the desire to
protect minority shareholder rights is an important reason causing some non-US ﬁrms crosslist in the United States). But see Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance:
Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 141, 142 (2003) (questioning the bonding role of
cross-listing and suggesting an alternative theory: “the avoiding hypothesis”).
24. Pine, supra note 7.
25. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 1 (2008),
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ2G-BWQR].
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million. 26 To implement bitcoin, Nakamoto devised the first blockchain to solve the
double-spending problem for digital currency (preventing people from spending the
same money twice). 27 There are two main ways to get bitcoin—to buy it on an
exchange such as Coinbase, or to earn it by processing bitcoin transactions, called
“mining.” 28 Owners store their bitcoin in a “digital wallet,” which exists either in the
cloud or on a user’s computer. 29
In the decade that Bitcoin has existed, it has amassed a plethora of issues that
continue to plague the virtual currency. Mainstream users have found it difficult to
trust bitcoin as a currency without a central bank underlying it. 30 The volatility of
Bitcoin’s price has discouraged many investors. 31 Bitcoin is neither intrinsically
valuable, like gold, nor is it rooted in a commodity expressing a certain purchasing
power. 32 There might be some value resulting from its scarcity, but it is an artificial
scarcity. 33 Generally, bitcoin as a currency is not regulated like stocks and futures,
and this lighter regulation allows price manipulation. 34 Bad actors can manipulate
the price of cryptocurrencies and then cash out before other investors realize. There
are also concerns about initial coin offerings of bitcoin, with the main reason for

26. David Groshoff, Kickstarter My Heart: Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the
Madness of Crowdfunding Constraints and Bitcoin Bubbles, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 489,
512 (2014).
27. Scott J. Shackelford & Steve Myers, Block-By-Block: Leveraging the Power of
Blockchain Technology to Build Trust and Promote Cyber Peace, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 334,
342 (2017).
28. Benjamin W. Akins, Jennifer L. Chapman & Jason M. Gordon, A Whole New World:
Income Tax Considerations of the Bitcoin Economy, 12 PITT. TAX REV. 25, 32 (2014).
29. Catherine Martin Christopher, Whack-A-Mole: Why Prosecuting Digital Currency
Exchanges Won’t Stop Online Money Laundering, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 14 (2014);
(Jan.
20,
2018),
How
to
Store
Your
Bitcoin,
COINDESK,
https://www.coindesk.com/information/how-to-store-your-bitcoins/ [https://perma.cc/24WVX8BE].
30. See, e.g., Jeff Kearns, Greenspan Says Bitcoin a Bubble Without Intrinsic Currency
Value, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2013, 5:37 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-1204/greenspan-says-bitcoin-a-bubble-without-intrinsic-currency-value.html
[https://perma.cc/59EE-SRPE]. But see Catherine Martin Christopher, The Bridging Model:
Exploring the Roles of Trust and Enforcement in Banking, Bitcoin, and the Blockchain, 17
NEV. L.J. 139, 139 (2016) (“Bitcoin has long been touted as a currency and a payment system
that relies on cryptography and mathematics rather than trust.”).
31. See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 30.
32. Nicholas A. Plassaras, Comment, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin
Within the Reach of the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 377, 390-91 (2013).
33. Only 21 million bitcoins will be issued. Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and
Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493, 1531 (2016).
34. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The
Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (1991).
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going public being for insiders to cash out. Additional concerns arise regarding a
bitcoin bubble. 35 This all contributes to bitcoin’s price volatility. 36
In the same way as foreign stocks, regulation may legitimize bitcoin to a certain
extent, which is particularly important given its start as an anonymous
cryptocurrency for illegal purposes. 37 Historically, the legitimizing effect of
regulation has brought some value. 38
It is true that there are drawbacks to regulation. For example, criticism has
targeted the enforcement of regulation, such as the possibility of bias in enforcement
of the laws. 39 Furthermore, there are separate critiques regarding the over-regulation
of the business environment. 40 These concerns with regulation no doubt hold true in
the bitcoin context, but must be considered alongside the benefits of regulation,
including those articulated by the Coffee bonding theory.
CONCLUSION
While bitcoin is a new product, it is experiencing issues similar to those of foreign
stocks. The Coffee bonding theory arose two decades ago to explain the significant

35. “Others, however, argue that this is all hype or technological alchemy and that the
current interest in virtual currencies is overblown and resembles wishful thinking, a fever,
even a mania. They have declared the 2017 heightened valuation of Bitcoin to be a bubble
similar to the famous ‘Tulip Bubble’ of the seventeenth century.” Written Testimony of
Chairman J. Christopher Giancarlo Before the U.S. Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry Committee, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/
hearings/state-of-the-cftc-examining-pending-rules-cryptocurrency-regulation-and-crossborder-agreements [https://perma.cc/A8VE-CZTV].
36. “In 2013, the market price of a bitcoin fluctuated between $13 and $1200 USD.”
Matthew Kien-Meng Ly, Note, Coining Bitcoin’s “Legal-Bits”: Examining the Regulatory
Framework for Bitcoin and Virtual Currencies, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 587, 590 (2014).
37. Sean Foley, Jonathan R. Karlsen & Tālis J. Putniņš, Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How
Much Illegal Activity is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies? 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 1798 (2018)
(estimating that “approximately one-quarter of bitcoin users and one-half of bitcoin
transactions are associated with illegal activity” and “[a]round $72 billion of illegal activity
per year involves bitcoin, which is close to the scale of the US and European markets for illegal
drugs.”).
38. Coffee, supra note 22 (suggesting that issuers migrate to U.S. exchanges because by
voluntarily subjecting themselves to the United States’ higher disclosure standards and greater
threat of enforcement, both by public and private enforcers, they partially compensate for weak
protection of minority investors under their own jurisdictions’ laws and thereby achieve a
higher market valuation).
39. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About Equal Justice
in U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247, 263 (2003).
40. See, e.g., Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as
Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315 (2012) (noting that
Dodd-Frank even extends to regulating conflict minerals for ethical reasons). For the argument
that tax incentives might be better solutions to certain corporate issues than regulation, see
Margaret Ryznar & Karen E. Woody, A Framework on Mandating Versus Incentivizing
Corporate Social Responsibility, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1667 (2015).
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cross-listing of foreign company shares on the American exchanges. According to
the theory, companies wanted the benefits of American securities law. Those foreign
companies that cross-listed their shares experienced measurable benefits from doing
so.
Bitcoin has similarly suffered legitimacy concerns and may need to benefit from
the legitimacy gained from regulation. Like foreign companies that cross-list their
shares on U.S. exchanges, bitcoin users may find themselves increasingly open to
regulation. 41

41. Coffee, supra note 22, at 1757.

